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Abstract. Proof-of-work blockchains must implement a difficulty adjust-
ment algorithm (DAA) in order to maintain a consistent inter-arrival time
between blocks. Conventional DAAs are essentially feedback controllers,
and as such, they are inherently reactive. This approach leaves them
susceptible to manipulation and often causes them to either under- or
over-correct. We present Bonded Mining, a proactive DAA that works
by collecting hash rate commitments secured by bond from miners. The
difficulty is set directly from the commitments and the bond is used to
penalize miners who deviate from their commitment. We devise a statisti-
cal test that is capable of detecting hash rate deviations by utilizing only
on-blockchain data. The test is sensitive enough to detect a variety of
deviations from commitments, while almost never misclassifying honest
miners. We demonstrate in simulation that, under reasonable assump-
tions, Bonded Mining is more effective at maintaining a target block
time than the Bitcoin Cash DAA, one of the newest and most dynamic
DAAs currently deployed. In this preliminary work, the lowest hash rate
miner our approach supports is 1% of the total and we directly consider
only two types of fundamental attacks. Future work will address these
limitations.
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1 Introduction
Blockchain protocols maintain a public ledger of account balances that are
updated by authorized transactions. Proof-of-work (PoW) mining is the process
of assembling transactions into blocks and earning the right to add the block to
a growing chain [24]. PoW mining involves repeatedly cryptographically hashing
the assembled block, each time with a different nonce. The hashes are generated
uniformly at random from a space with maximum value S. When a hash falls
below a target t, the corresponding block is said to be mined, and it is added to
the blockchain. Closely related to target is the difficulty3 D, which is equal to S/t.
3 Technically D = t0/t, where t0 ≈ S is the target with highest possible difficulty, but this
detail is not important for our analysis.
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The expected time required to mine a block is a function of D and the rate that
hashes are generated, or hash rate h. Hash rate fluctuates (sometimes rapidly)
over time, and therefore PoW blockchains must adjust D to ensure that the
expected block time remains roughly constant. Currently, all PoW blockchains
use a difficulty adjustment algorithm (DAA) to adjust D as h fluctuates.
Although implementations vary widely, each DAA is essentially a feedback
controller analogous to a thermostat. The DAA uses previous block creation
times to detect a change in h, and then it makes an adjustment to D in order
to move the expected times toward the desired value T . There are three major
limitations to this reactive approach.
1. There is a tendency to either over or under correct, which can cause oscillations
in block time [29, 30].
2. Contentious hard forks create significant instability in block times for mi-
nority hash rate blockchains, which must resort to a backup controller that
compensates for swings in miner hash rate allocation preference [31].
3. Most control algorithms can be gamed by miners without consequence in
order to extract higher rewards [18, 21], causing fluctuations in block time as
a result.
4. Feedback control is inherently reactionary; it only uses historical block time
and difficulty data to produce future difficulty values.
Contributions. We present Bonded Mining, a protocol that enhances PoW
mining with a proactive approach to difficulty adjustment so that inter-block
times are always near their desired value despite sudden hash rate changes. The
idea is to ask miners to commit to their individual hash rate and financially bind
them to it by holding bond. Difficulty is adjusted based on these self-reported
commitments. Miners are incentivized to commit to a realistic estimate of their
future hash rate and honor their commitment, even if it becomes nominally more
profitable to direct their hash rate elsewhere. The protocol is flexible: miner
commitments last until they mine their next block; and they can deviate from
the commitment (incurring a penalty commensurate with their deviation) as long
as they are truthful about the deviation.
For security, we derive a statistical test (using on-blockchain data only) that
is capable of detecting both short- and long-term deception from miners. Miners
who fail the test suffer a significant financial penalty. The test is sensitive enough
to detect a miner who drops to 20% of her commitment for a week or more, and
it can also detect when she strays from her commitment by as little as 1% every
block over the course of 70 days or more. This sensitivity comes with very little
risk for honest miners. Even when a miner deviates from her commitment, if she
truthfully reports that deviation, then the probability of failing any test over the
course of a year is less than 0.3%.
Because of its proactive design and the penalties associated with deception,
Bonded Mining is better capable of maintaining the desired expected block times
than are conventional, reactive approaches. In Bonded Mining, the extent to
which block times remain close to desired time T is the extent to which miners
value their bond more than a change in their hash rate. In simulation, we find
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Fig. 1: An overview of Bonded Mining for miner m.
that even when miners are willing to sacrifice 25% of their bond in order to
change their hash rate, Bonded Mining still demonstrates lower amplitude and
duration of deviations from T than does the DAA of Bitcoin Cash, the latter of
which is one of the newest and most dynamic DAAs currently deployed.
2 Protocol Details
Bonded Mining enhances existing PoW mining schemes by adding a collateral
requirement to ensure hash rate commitments are honored. Figure 1 illustrates
many aspects of the protocol, and a List of Symbols appears in the Appendix.
To bootstrap, miner m must post bond to the blockchain by paying b coins into
a bond pool account via a validated deposit transaction. The bond is posted prior
to mining the first block and is locked until the miner produces his first n blocks,
where n is a tunable security parameter depending on the miner’s hash rate. As
part of the deposit transaction, miner m also stipulates his commitment cm1 for
the hash rate he will apply to mining his first block, km1 .
Mining. Now consider the next n− 1 blocks mined by m: km2 , . . . , kmn . Define
t(kmi ) as the time that k
m
i is mined. Let t(k
m
0 ) be defined as the time of the
block containing the deposit transaction. When mining block kmi , miner m adds
a new deposit transaction to the set of transactions being mined, which deposits
an additional b coins to the bond pool. In assembling the block, he uses the
typical block header, and includes two new pieces of information: report rmi
and commitment cmi+1. Report r
m
i is an attestation from miner m of his actual
average hash rate during the time period between t(kmi−1) and t(k
m
i ). And c
m
i+1
is m’s commitment for the next block kmi+1. If m wishes to stop after n blocks,
then he can issue a divestment transaction (see Bond state section below) and
cmn+1 is unnecessary; otherwise c
m
n+1 should contain the commitment for the next
block. When block kmi is eventually mined by m, the coinbase is immediately
transferred to the miner’s wallet, but bond is released only upon reconciliation.
To be clear: the miner can adjust commitments each block starting from block
km2 ; but reconciliation begins from block k
m
n onward and evaluates a window of
the previous n blocks.
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Reconciliation. If i blocks, i > n, have been mined by m, then his block kmi
includes a reconciliation transaction that pays himself a reconciliation payment
fmi ≤ b from the bond pool. fmi is the refunded portion of the bond deposited by
m while mining block kmi−n, which is now eligible to be reconciled. (Miners never
forfeit coinbase rewards.) Miner m signs and confirms his own reconciliation
transaction, but if he repays an inappropriate amount, then the transaction is
considered to be invalid by other miners and the entire block is ignored. The
value of fmi is determined in two stages. The first tests m’s reporting accuracy via
binary hypothesis test Valid(rm), which deterministically rejects or accepts the
null hypothesis that the inter-block times from t(kmi−n), . . . , t(k
m
i ) are samples
that came from the distribution implied by reports rm = rmi−n, . . . , r
m
i . If the null
hypothesis is rejected, then fmi = 0; i.e., m loses all his bond deposited in block
kmi−n. However, if the null hypothesis is not rejected, then in the second stage we
evaluate m’s commitment fulfillment by setting
fmi = b− b ·min
{
1,
∣∣∣∣rmi − cmicmi
∣∣∣∣} . (1)
We tune the hypothesis test so that if m honestly reports his hash rate for each
block kmj , then he is very likely to pass, and then m will be repaid his bond as
the absolute difference between his committed and actual hash rates.
Bond State. We define four distinct states for bonded miners: Bootstrapping,
Fully Bonded, Divested, and Abandoned. A new miner who has not yet deposited
nb total bond is bootstrapping. Once she has contributed n mined blocks to the
main chain, her total bond reaches nb and the miner is considered fully bonded.
Note that the number of blocks required to reach the Fully Bonded state depends
on the miner’s committed hash rate as a fraction of the total. Accordingly, miners
may fluctuate between Bootstrapping and Fully Bonded states if the total hash
rate changes. A fully bonded miner is eligible to divest her bond in order to
reduce her hash rate on the blockchain to zero. The miner signals this intent by
submitting a divestment transaction, which can appear in any block, not just one
that she mines. The transaction contains reconciliation payments (see above) for
each of her n bond deposits that remain in the bond pool. Once the divestment
transaction is confirmed, the miner is fully divested: she is committed to zero
hash rate and has no remaining bond. In order to begin mining again, a divested
miner must proceed through the Bootstrap state. Finally, a miner can reach the
Abandoned state from either the Bootstrapping or Fully Bonded states if she fails
to generate a block in a reasonable amount of time given her last commitment
(see below). If the miner reaches the Abandoned state, all of her bond is lost,
and she transitions to the Divested state. (The bond is burned, but could be
redistributed as future coinbase.)
Abandonment Detection. The test for abandonment is distinct from the test
Valid. It is conducted every block (as opposed to only those generated by the
miner). For each miner m in either the Bootstrapping or Fully Bonded state,
we have cmi , the latest commitment from m. We argue in Section 4 that if m
honors her commitment, then the inter-arrival time of her ith block, Tmi , is
exponential. Specifically, Tmi ∼ Expon(T/cmi ) where T is the target inter-block
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interval for the network. Now let Q(p) be the quantile function for Tmi such that
P (Tmi < Q(p)) < p. With probability p, we know that T
m
i will be less than Q(p).
Therefore, for large p, we can be almost certain that m has abandoned mining at
her committed hash rate if no block hash been seen for time Q(p).
For example, consider a miner who commits to 10% of the total hash rate
in a protocol like Bitcoin with T = 10 minute block times. With probability
exceeding 99.999%, it will take m no more than 20 hours to mine her next block.
Thus, by setting the abandonment time to 20 hours, we can be highly confident
that m has in fact abandoned mining at her committed hash rate.
Difficulty Adjustment. Let ci and hi be the total committed and actual hash
rates, respectively, across all miners for the time period in which block ki will be
mined. Bonded Mining makes the assumption that security parameters b and n
are tuned so that miners are incentivized to honor their committed hash rate
during this time period, i.e. ci = hi. It is known [25] that the hash target t is
related to total hash rate hi by the equation
hiT = S/t, (2)
where T is the expected time to produce a block and S is the size of the hash
space, as defined above. Given the equivalences ci = hi and D = S/t (defined in
Section 1), we arrive at the following formula for difficulty.
Di = ciT. (3)
Commitment Constraints. Because the difficulty is derived directly from
miner commitments (Eq. 3), it is possible for an attacker to falsely raise the
difficulty arbitrarily high at a cost limited to bond b. To prevent this attack, it is
important to ensure that every miner’s commitment is realistic given their past
hash rate. This constraint has ramifications for both bootstrapping and fully
bonded miners (those with nb coins in the bond pool). For a fully bonded miner,
we stipulate that she can change her commitment by no more than some multiple
µ times her average commitment over the previous n blocks (e.g., µ = 2). As
a protection against Sybil attacks [10] described later, we allow up to fraction
γ of the total commitment for block ki to come from bootstrapping miners
(i.e., miners who have deposited fewer than nb coins into the bond pool). If the
aggregate commitments exceed fraction γ, then they are cut proportionately
down to the maximum. Fraction γ, which is also tunable, should be fairly small
(e.g., γ = 0.05) because new miners have much less at stake than established
miners (fewer coins in deposit), and the network has observed fewer blocks from
which to assess their hash rate potential. The values for both µ and γ should
be set by the community at large (not just miners) and can also be updated
regularly to respond to changes in miner composition.
Mining Pools. The Bonded Mining protocol is agnostic to the presence of
mining pools, but the protocol does not greatly impinge on the ability to operate
a pool effectively. Commitments must be made at the pool level, thus they can be
changed only as often as the pool mines a block. A pool could aggregate constituent
miner preferences in between blocks and update the overall commitment based on
those preferences for the next block. Thus, if a pool mines a block approximately
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once an hour, then miners would be free to adjust their hash rate allocation to
that pool with the same frequency.
3 Threat Model
Primary Threats. In the next sections, we focus our security analysis on attacks
from miners who report their hash rate dishonestly. Rational miners intent on
deviating from their commitment for x blocks will report dishonestly when their
preference to deviate exceeds the greater of the value of coins at risk or penalty
associated with honestly reporting the deviations (i.e., x(b− fm)). (We discuss
coins at risk in Section 5 and preference in Section 6.) In this sense, Bonded
Mining can ensure miners honor their commitment only to the extent that the
fiat value of bond exceeds the value of mining on a different blockchain. There are
numerous ways that an attacker can falsify reports, but in this preliminary work
we focus on short-range and long-range attacks. A short-range attack involves
an attacker significantly deviating from his commitment for a relatively small
number of sequential blocks. In this context, we are primarily concerned with the
attacker committing to a large hash rate, and subsequently dramatically lowering
that hash rate, which would tend to increase block times during the attack. In
contrast, the long-range attacker deviates subtly from his commitment over the
course of many blocks. Although not catastrophic during a short period of time,
this attack can lead to systematic deviations from the target block time.
Sybil Attacks. A single miner (or a cooperating coalition of miners) can always
split his hash rate to appear to be multiple, lower hash rate miners in a Sybil
attack [10]. Therefore, it is important to make incentives equitable for miners
of any hash rate in order to encourage honest representation of affiliation and
avoid the formation of mining cabals. We tune the Bonded Mining protocol to
ensure that: (i) after Bootstrap, the amount of bond locked up at any given time
is proportional to the miner’s committed hash rate; and (ii) the expected lockup
time for bond and the expected probability of losing that bond are equal across
hash rates for honest miners. We do not, however, attempt to align penalties
for attacking miners with varying hash rates. That is to say, it will be possible
that an attacker will suffer a lesser penalty by breaking up his hash rate among
multiple identities. Note that this sort of asymmetry exists with other attacks.
For example, a selfish mining attack only becomes possible for miners with a
certain minimum percentage of the total hash rate.
Other Attacks. Bonded Mining’s commitment validation test uses the inter-
block times of each miner’s own blocks; therefore, one miner’s hash rate cannot
influence the test results of another miner. We do not consider out-of-band denial-
of-service attacks. A selfish mining (SM) attack [12] by one miner would alter
inter-block times of the other miners by increasing their orphan rate. However,
bonded miners could easily adjust their commitment to account for orphaned
blocks due to an SM attack. Alternatively, Eq. 3 could be modified to take into
account a miner’s orphaned blocks [14]. In fact, Bonded Mining makes it possible
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to attribute SM behavior to one or more miners who have a much lower orphan
rate than other miners; we leave this analysis to future work. Doublespend (DS)
attacks [24] are more challenging to carry out in Bonded Mining since the attacker
must both succeed and avoid a commitment validation test failure in order to
prevent loss of bond. Lastly, a miner could falsely report the timestamp in her
own block headers. We do not investigate the impact of timestamp manipulation
in this preliminary work, but note that the Bonded Mining protocol could impose
restrictions on timestamps to greatly reduce the impact of such an attack. For
example, it could stipulate that miners should synchronize clocks using NTP and
that a miner should discard any block header that reports a timestamp deviating
from their own clock by more than a reasonable block header propagation delay,
perhaps 30 seconds.
4 Report Validity Test
We require a statistical test of the validity of a sequence of reports rm1 , . . . , r
m
n
from miner m. The test should have have both high precision and recall in order
to simultaneously prevent malicious attacks while refraining from bond slashing
honest miners with high probability. It should also be capable of simultaneously
detecting various types of attacks. In this section, we describe a statistical test
that effectively detects both short- and long-range attacks. It requires a sample
of n of the miner’s most recent reports, where n varies with her hash rate, but
can otherwise be treated as a black-box test within the Bonded Mining protocol.
Our approach is to use the popular one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
test [22] as a building block for test Valid. It is tempting to use a simpler point
estimate of hash rate expected value as opposed to a goodness-of-fit (GoF) test
over an entire distribution (which is provided by the KS test). There are two
reasons that a distribution test is more desirable. First, the KS test is much more
sensitive to systematic deviations in hash rate. Second, point estimates allow for
attacks in which miners game the system by, for example, front loading all of
their hash rate at the beginning of a test window; in that case the correct mean
will be achieved, but the distribution will be wrong.
Consider the random sequence Tm = Tm1 , . . . , T
m
n , denoting the inter-arrival
times of blocks km1 , . . . , k
m
n mined by m. By h
m
1 , . . . , h
m
n we denote the actual
average hash rate for miner m, with hmi associated with the time between blocks
kmi−1 and k
m
i (h
m
i = r
m
i when m reports hash rate honestly). Eq. 3 can be
rewritten as E[Tmi ] = Dˆ
m
i /h
m
i , (4)
where Dˆmi is the average difficulty between blocks k
m
i−1 and k
m
i ; i.e. the expected
time required for m to mine her ith block is equal to the average difficulty divided
by her hash rate. It is well known [5, 27] that each Tmi follows the exponential
distribution. That is, Tmi ∼ Expon(Dˆmi /hmi ). And because the distribution is a
scale family, it is straightforward to show that (Tmi h
m
i /Dˆ
m
i ) ∼ Expon(1). Now
define statistic Xm = Xm1 , . . . , X
m
n such that X
m
i = T
m
i r
m
i /Dˆ
m
i . When m reports
honestly, we have Xmi ∼ Expon(1).
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Fig. 2: Empirical cumulative distribution
of p-values over 1000 trials for 500 sam-
ples drawn from the true distribution
Expon(1) (blue, dashed), and a deviant
sequence of exponential random variables
with mean drawn from a random walk
about 1 with standard deviation equal to
0.01 (orange, solid). The true samples
manifest p-values according to Eq. 5, in
that for any given x ∈ [0, 1], approxi-
mately x p-values fall under value x.
The one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test is a statistical test of the
null hypothesis H0 that samples xm = xm1 , . . . , xmn , collectively an instance
of Xm, were drawn from a given distribution. In our case, the distribution is
Expon(1). The KS statistic is given by ∆n = supx |Sn(x) − F (x)|, where F (x)
is the cumulative distribution function for Expon(1) and Sn(x) is the empirical
distribution function derived from samples xm. The alternative hypothesis H1
contends that the samples were not drawn from Expon(1). Now let p(∆n) be the
p-value for ∆n and define δi to be a realization of ∆n. By definition [8],
P (p(∆n) < τ | Xm ∼ Expon(1)) < τ. (5)
Therefore, assuming that xm was drawn from Expon(1), we are guaranteed that
the rejection region p(δn) < τ will carry probability of type-I error (falsely
rejecting H0) no greater than τ . Accordingly, large p-values provide evidence in
support of H0 and low values provide evidence in support of H1.
Figure 2 shows the empirical cumulative distribution for p(δn) drawn from two
different distributions: true and deviant. The true samples (blue, dashed curve)
are drawn from distribution Expon(1) while the deviant samples (orange, solid
curve) are drawn from a sequence of exponential random variables with mean
changing according to a random walk about 1 with standard deviation equal to
0.01. The true samples produce nearly perfect p-values in that approximately
fraction x of all trials fall below p-value x, indicating an accurate estimation of
type-I error. The deviant samples manifest significantly lower p-values, indicating
high confidence in H1. Approximately 30% of deviant samples register a p-value
very close to 0. We summarize a binary test based on the KS statistic below.
DEFINITION 1: For tunable threshold τ ∈ [0, 1], test KS(rm;n, τ) is equal to 1
when the p-value p(δn) of KS statistic ∆n exceeds τ and 0 otherwise. Accordingly,
the probability of a type-I error is equal to τ .
Because we are interested in detecting both short- and long-range attacks,
we apply two KS tests: one over a short window ns; and the other over a longer
window nl. Associated with these tests are the thresholds τs and τl, respectively.
The window sizes and thresholds vary with both test type and the miner’s
committed hash rate. We combine the two tests into one to form Valid by
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multiplying their output. The probability of a type-I error in Valid is bounded
by τs + τl because it occurs if there is a type-I error in either of the KS tests.
DEFINITION 2: Valid(rm;ns, nl, τs, τl) is equal to 1 when both KS(r
m;ns, τs)
and KS(rm;nl, τl) are equal to 1, and it is 0 otherwise. The probability of a type-I
error is bounded by τs + τl.
5 Attack Risk and Detection
In this section, we quantify the coins at risk for miners who report their hash rate
dishonestly, which we regard as an attack. When a miner fails test Valid, her
entire bond of nb coins are lost and she must proceed through the Bootstrapping
state to resume mining. Thus, at a minimum, the coins at risk are the expected
amount of bond lost when test Valid fails. But, any failure is also a significant
step back for a miner, the γ parameter (see Section 2) limits her committed
hash rate during bootstrap (a period of about 70 days), which amounts to an
opportunity cost in terms of coinbase revenue.
We ran a simulator of PoW block mining to test the ability for a dishonest
miner, with varying fraction of the total hash power, to conceal short- and long-
range deviations from her commitment. We evaluated miners in three categories:
(i) honest, (ii) short-range dishonest, and (iii) long-range dishonest. All miners
varied their commitment each time they generated a block by performing a random
walk with standard deviation equal to 1% of their originally committed hash
rate. Honest miners always reported this deviation, while long-range dishonest
miners reported that their commitment never changed from its original value.
Short-range dishonest miners were honest about their long-range deviations in
hash rate (just like honest miners), but at the end of each test window they
mined at 1/5 of their committed hash rate for approximately one week, while
reporting no deviation from their commitment.
We generated block creation times by sampling from Expon(αT ), where α
was given by the ratio of total hash rate hi to actual miner hash rate h
m
i . (αT is
equivalent to Eq. 4 when actual hash rates are known.) Each block was randomly
assigned to either the honest or dishonest groups with a probability proportional
to the fraction of total hash rate possessed by the dishonest group.
Test Application. There are two separate, but related, goals for test Valid.
First, given a single sequence of n consecutive blocks called a test window, we
require that Valid can distinguish between honest and either short- or long-range
dishonest miners by means of a statistical test on sub-windows of size ns and
nl within the those n blocks. Second, to understand the probability of ongoing
attack success, we also require that Valid continue to differentiate between
honest and either short- or long-range dishonest miners during a long temporal
sequence of overlapping test windows. The two goals are met by applying test
Valid(rm;ns, nl, τs, τl) with the long window nl = n, short window ns  n,
short threshold τs, and long threshold τl all defined so that the probability of
a type-I error remains extremely low for an entire year of mining. Our metrics
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Table 1: Parameters choices for test Valid given committed hash rate as a percentage of the
total. Short- and long-range test sub-window sizes are reported as ns and nl, respectively,
while short- and long-range tolerances are reported as τs and τl, respectively.
committed short long short long
hash rate window ns window nl threshold τs threshold τl
1% 2 100 10−7 10−7
10% 20 1000 10−10 10−10
25% 50 2500 10−12 10−12
50% 100 5000 10−12 10−12
for success are type-I error and attack detection rate (i.e., the rate at which
Valid = 0 when applied to the attacker’s test windows). The former should be
sufficiently close to 0 so as to encourage honest miners. And the latter should be
somewhat higher than 0 so as to discourage dishonest miners. These parameters
can be chosen offline and independent of blockchain conditions.
Parameter Selection. Table 1 shows the parameter choices we made, which we
applied to all experiments reported below. In general, lower hash rate miners (as
a percentage of the total) require smaller windows for Valid to produce dishonest-
detection rates that would be significant to attackers. This is a desirable property
because lower hash rate miners require more time to produce blocks. We chose
ns and nl so that the expected temporal duration of each test sub-window was
the same for miners across all hash rates (approximately 1.5 days for ns and 70
days for nl). We then chose the values for τs and τl to render the probability
of type-I error close to 0, even after one year of expected mining time. These
parameter choices are validated in the next sections.
Attack Detection. In Table 1 we specify short- and long-range test sub-windows
for committed hash rates varying from 50% down to 1% of the network total.
Given these parameters, the short-range sub-window for a miner committed to
1% of the hash rate is ns = 2. To discourage Sybil attacks parameters must be
chosen equitably for honest miners with any hash rate, as we argue in Section 3.
This implies that, in its current incarnation, Bonded Mining cannot support
miner commitments less than 0.5% of the total hash rate, because this would
require a value for ns that is less than 1. Note that this limitation is tied to the
amount of proof of work we receive from miners; i.e., we cannot detect an attack
during periods of time when the miner does not produce blocks. For BTC and
BCH, respectively, 99.4% and 98.6% of the total hash rate from March 24–June
24, 2019 was contributed by miners with at least 1% of the hash rate.4 Smaller
miners do not need to be excluded from the system as they can join a larger
pool. And in future work, we will explore PoW schemes such as Bobtail [5] and
FruitChains [26] that have miners broadcast additional PoW information. For
4 See https://btc.com/stats/pool and https://bch.btc.com/stats/pool.
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Table 2: [Attacks During Bootstrapping] Results over 1000 trials of test Valid for various
attacker hash rates (as a percentage of the total) and parameters selected according to
Table 1. All results in this table correspond to dishonest miners who deviate from their
committed hash rate during bootstrap. Long-range attackers deviate according to a random
walk with standard deviation equal to 1% of their commitment. Short-range attackers drop
to 1/5 of their committed hash rate for the last ns blocks in the window, where ns is
determined by Table 1. See Fig. 3 for rates after bootstrapping.
Committed Short-range Long-range
hash rate detection rate detection rate
1% 0.033 0.271
10% 0.108 0.653
25% 0.837 0.660
50% 1.000 0.546
example, Bobtail could easily decrease Bonded Mining’s minimum allowable hash
rate by several orders of magnitude.
5.1 Accuracy of Valid Over the Bootstrapping Window
Table 2 shows the probability of attack detection at the end of the bootstrapping
window (block n) for short- and long-range attackers. Results are based on
parameters from Table 1 for four different hash rate percentages, averaged over
1000 trials for each. We do not show the rate of type-I error when miners are
honest because not a single error was encountered in the 1000 trials. However,
by construction, the probability of a type-I error in any given test window is
bounded by τs + τl.
The most important detection rate is for the 1% miner because a high
hash rate miner can masquerade as multiple low hash rate miners. Thus, a
determined attacker can avoid detection during the Bootstrapping state with
96.7% probability. From Table 1, n = nl = 100; and thus there are 0.03nb = 3b
coins at risk for the attacking miner. We show next that any initial success will
likely be short-lived and the coins at risk will rise if the attacker continues as a
fully bonded miner.
5.2 Attacks by Fully Bonded Miners
Once in the Fully Bonded state, a miner can remain in that state by continuing to
add a new commitment for each additional block mined. Valid is tested against
the sliding window of the n most-recent blocks generated by the miner. These
sliding windows are highly dependent since adjacent windows share all but one
block. If any single test fails, the total bond of nb is lost.
We simulated one year’s worth of blocks from attacking miners subject to
Table 1 parameters, and we determined the mean probability (across 1000 trials)
that Valid detects at least one attack during the year. Results in Figure 3 show
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Fig. 3: [Attacks by fully bonded miners.]
Probability that at least one test window fails
Valid for short-range (top) and long-range
(bottom) attacks spanning up to one year in
duration. Short-range curves not visible are
extremely close to probability 1.0 at nearly all
times. (Note, for those not reading in color:
in the top plot, the 50% curve appears above
the 1% curve; and in the bottom plot, curves
appear in the following order from top to
bottom: 25%, 10%, 50%, 1%.)
that approximately 30 days after bootstrapping, even attacks by 1% miners are
detected with 50% probability. Thus, since again n = nl = 100, the coins at risk
after 30 days of attack is 0.5nb = 50b.
Probability of type-I error. We ran the same experiment for honest miners
who similarly varied their hash rate as in the short- and long-range attacks
for multiple test windows spanning a year in duration, except that in these
experiments miners reported their hash rate honestly. Over the course 1000 trials
for each set of parameters selected from Table 1, test Valid never returned a false
positive in any test window throughout the simulated year of mining across all
hash rate commitments and for both short- and long-range deviations. Therefore,
the probability of type-I error is no higher than 0.003 based on a 95% confidence
interval from the 1000 trials [15]. Overall, miners that honestly report their
commitments are very unlikely to fail test Valid.
6 Block Time Stability
Section 4 introduces a hypothesis test for determining when a miner reports his
hash rate honestly over a window of n consecutive blocks that he has mined. If
the miner fails this test, his bond of nb coins is lost; and if he misbehaves such
that his probability of failure is p, then we say that he has pnb coins at risk.
On the other hand, an honest miner, who passes the test, is eligible to submit
a transaction in the next block that reconciles the bond deposited for the first
block in the window, with the reconciliation fee fm being paid according to Eq. 1.
Thus, when deviating from his commitment for x blocks, a rational miner will
report honestly when pnb exceeds x(b− fm). Section 5 quantified pnb for various
attacks. In this section, we assume that coins at risk are high enough that the
miner always reports his hash rate honestly (i.e. pnb > x(b− fm)). Nevertheless,
he might still change his commitment dramatically or even deviate significantly
from his commitment (all considered honest behavior). Naturally, these deviations
can affect the performance of the DAA. Thus, our goal is to (i) quantify the
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Fig. 4: Comparison of expected block times in simulation for (left) the Bitcoin Cash protocol
(BCH) and (right) the Bonded Mining protocol (BM) where miner cost tolerance is κ = 0.25.
Bottom facets show fluctuations in miner hash rates, while the top facets show the block
time that results from the DAA response to those fluctuations. The target block time for
both protocols is T = 600 seconds. Relative to BCH, The BM DAA deviates less from
desired block time in terms of amplitude and duration.
affect on block times given various magnitudes of hash rate deviation, and (ii)
quantify the financial cost to a miner who performs these deviations.
6.1 Block Time Simulation
To achieve the goals of this section, we created an expected block time simulation
that takes aggregate miner hash rate as input, generates blocks according to
current hash rate and difficulty, and runs a DAA to update the difficulty. We
compared two scenarios: one using the DAA for Bitcoin Cash (BCH, for brevity);
and the other using the Bonded Mining protocol DAA (BM, for brevity). We
chose to compare against Bitcoin Cash because it uses one of the newest and
most dynamic DAAs currently deployed. Because the simulation reports expected
block time, it is deterministic given miner preferences (Table 3). The simulation
is meant to highlight DAA behavior in a variety circumstances, we leave more
systematic analysis to future work.
Table 3: Hash rate preferences, expressed as a percentage of total available hash rate, for
miners during two weeks of simulated mining. The stated preference extends from the stated
day until the next stated day or the end of the experiment.
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8 Day 9
10% 7.5% 22.5% 11.3% 22.5% 28.1% 56.3% 42.2% 21.1%
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Blocks. Both BCH and BM targeted block time T = 600 seconds. In both cases,
the expected block time was calculated as T ·Di/hi (a relationship that follows
from Eq. 2), where hi and Di are the total hash rate and difficulty, respectively,
during the period when block i is mined.
Preference. At any given time we assumed that miners had a preference for
what percentage of their hash rate they would like to apply to mining on the
Bonded Mining blockchain. The notion of preference captures a miner’s tendency
to either divert her hash rate to another blockchain or stop mining altogether.
Preferences could change, for example, because of changes in coin or energy prices.
We do not model miner preferences but rather treat them as input.
Hash rate. For simplicity, we adjusted all hash rates in unison every block (as
though all miners acted in concert). But we set the block window to n = 1000
and updated commitments only every 10th block as if the network was comprised
of 10 miners, each having 10% of the total hash rate. Over the course of two
weeks of simulated mining time, miners developed the preference for a given
hash rate at different times, expressed as a percentage of their total hash rate
available (see Table 3). For BCH, miners immediately realized their hash rate
preference. However, for BM, miners were restricted in two ways: (i) we set the
commitment constraint to µ = 2 (see Section 2) so that miners could not change
their commitment by more than twice the average of their n earlier commitments;
and (ii) miners were averse to deviating from their commitments because such
deviations would result in a loss of bond. Note that BM miners were assumed to
be fully bonded, so parameter γ was not relevant.
Cost tolerance. Miners obeyed a variable cost tolerance, κ, expressed as a
fraction of per-block bond b, which is the amount of bond that they were willing
to lose per block due to deviation from their commitment. For example, if κ = 0.1
and b = 100 USD, miners are willing to lose up to 10 USD per block by deviating
from their commitment if there exists a 10 USD opportunity cost for mining on
the present chain over another.
Difficulty adjustment. The target block time for the simulation was T = 600
seconds. BCH used the Bitcoin Cash DAA [28]: the rolling sum (over the last 144
blocks) of difficulty D (which gives the expected number of hashes performed)
and block time M are calculated; the block time sum is clamped with a high
and low pass filter: M ′ = max{72 · T,min{M, 288 · T}}; and the new difficulty
becomes D/M ′. The DAA for BM was Eq. 3: Di = ciT , which is the product of
target block time and total committed hash rate.
6.2 Simulation Results
During the two weeks of simulated mining time, hash rate preferences changed
according to Table 3. Figure 4 compares the resulting expected block times for
each. BCH (left plot) shows several interesting features. First, we can see that
expected block time deviates significantly from the target time during periods
immediately following a major change in hash rate: the most dramatic drop is to
250 seconds, and the most dramatic rise is to nearly 1500 seconds. Moreover, these
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deviations were not corrected by the DAA for up to one day following the change
in hash rate. Second, even during times when hash rate remains unchanged (for
examples the period after Day 11, the expected block time oscillates about the
target time. We suspect that this phenomenon is due to a feedback cycle that
emerges from the DAA, which itself is essentially a feedback controller.
In contrast, Figure 4 (right) shows that BM has much lower amplitude and
duration of deviation from expected block time relative to BCH. And when hash
rate is not changing, BM is able to maintain an expected block time that exactly
matches the target time.
The Bonded Mining protocol is able to keep expected block time close to the
target time by controlling the change in commitment and the tendency to deviate
from that commitment. Miners are not allowed to vary their commitments by
more than factor µ = 2 from the average of previous commitments. Nevertheless,
they may still vary their actual hash rate as long as they can tolerate the penalty.
Figure 4 (right) shows that miners with cost tolerance κ = 0.25 will follow their
hash rate preference, but only up to a point. When the preference deviates far
beyond what the factor µ allows, miners cease to change their hash rate in order
to avoid bond loss beyond 25% per block. Figure 5 shows how the expected block
time begins to deviate more and more as the cost tolerance κ increases up to 1.0.
What is not shown in the figure is that for κ = 1.0, the hash rate preference is
followed perfectly, meaning that miners sacrifice as much bond as is necessary to
meet their preference. For κ = 1.0, the worst-case scenario for Bonded Mining,
Figure 5 also shows that while the duration of deviation from the target block
time is longer than for BCH, the maximum deviation is less.
6.3 Setting the Bond
We have intentionally not specified how the community should choose the per-
block bond value b. It is a security parameter that trades off between accessibility
and security of mining, and the correct tradeoff is subjective. For example,
consider setting b equal to 1/10 the coinbase value. This requires a fully bonded
miner (with any committed hash rate) to lockup the equivalent of approximately
10% of her mining profit for 70 days. This financial commitment is a strong
deterrent for would-be attackers since failing even a single test Valid results in a
total loss of bond. We do note that it could be a significant hardship for miners
who operate on slim profit margins.
7 Related Work
Considerable effort has been devoted to refining the PoW difficulty adjustment
algorithm (DAA) in the context of feedback control. In comparison to Bonded
Mining, these past approaches do not solicit information on future hash rate
from miners. They suffer from oscillations and delay in reaching the target block
time because they are reactive rather than proactive.
Alternative DAAs include methods by Kraft [20], Meshkov et al. [23], Fullmer
and Morse [13], and Hovland et al. [17]. Meshkov et al. note that alternating
between coins has an effect on inter-block time. Grunspan and Pe´rez-Marco [14]
recently proposed a modified DAA that includes uncle blocks in the difficulty
calculation to thwart selfish mining. The recent fork of Bitcoin Cash (BCH) [1]
from the core Bitcoin blockchain [2] (BTC) sparked a flurry of DAA research.
The principal concern was to mitigate affects of fickle mining [21], where miners
abruptly move their hash power from the BCH to the BTC blockchain (or vice
versa). See also Aggarwal and Tan for an analysis of mining during that time [3].
Se´chet devised the algorithm cw-144 [28], which is currently used in BCH; it uses
the ratio of the rolling average of chain work to block time and was based on
an early model from Kyuupichan [6]. Harding’s wt-144 [16] is a similar solution,
weighting block time by recency and block target. Stone [30] proposed adding
tail removal to the algorithms above, which drives down the difficulty within a
block interval in order to guarantee liveness and dampen block time oscillations.
We use a bond as collateral for a pledge to perform an offered hash rate over a
specific period of time. Similarly, Proof of Stake (PoS) protocols (including hybrid
PoW/PoS) [4, 7, 11] accept collateral as a pledge to act honestly in validating
transactions over a specific period of time. We do not intend our work to be a
replacement for PoS, but note that Bonded Mining similarly provides a fixed set
of consensus participants that in our case are validated by PoW. For hybrids
of PoW/PoS and hybrids of PoW/BFT [9, 19], Bonded Mining can bolster the
performance of the PoW component.
8 Conclusion
We presented Bonded Mining, a proactive DAA for PoW blockchains that sets
the mining difficulty based on bonded commitments from miners. The protocol
incentivizes a miner to honor his commitment by confiscating a fraction of bond
that is proportional to the deviation from his commitment. We developed a
statistical test that is capable of detecting short- and long-range deviations from
commitments with very low probability of falsely implicating honest miners. In
simulation, and under reasonable assumptions, we showed that Bonded Mining
is more successful at maintaining a consistent inter-block time than is the DAA
of Bitcoin Cash, one of the newest and most dynamic DAAs in production. The
present work is preliminary, having the following limitations: (i) currently the
lowest hash rate miner that it supports has 1% of the total; (ii) we have only
demonstrated defenses against two types of attacks; and (iii) we only directly
16
compare Bonded Mining to the Bitcoin Cash DAA. Future work will seek to
address these limitations. We recommend these limitations be fully investigated
before deployment.
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A List of Symbols
Symbol Description
m miner
n, ns, nl blocks in test window: generic, short, long
b bond, a portion of coin held until miner passes test Valid
kmi ith block mined by m
ci committed hash rate for entire network between blocks i− 1 and i
cmi hash rate commitment for m between blocks k
m
i−1 and k
m
i
hi actual hash rate for entire network between blocks i− 1 and i
hmi actual hash rate for m between blocks k
m
i−1 and k
m
i
rmi reported hash rate for m between blocks k
m
i−1 and k
m
i
fmi reconciliation payment to m in block k
m
i
Tmi time between k
m
i−1 and k
m
i
T target inter-block time
Di mining difficulty (expected number of hashes per block) between blocks i− 1 and i
Dˆmi average difficulty between blocks k
m
i−1 and k
m
i
µ maximum multiplicative increase in commitment over previous average
γ maximum fraction of total hash rate allowed in Bootstraping state
τs, τl short- and long-range KS test tolerances
∆n KS test statistic for window size n
p(∆n) p-value for ∆n
κ miner cost tolerance, expressed as fraction of bond b
18
